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Orr v. Orr: A Husband's Constitutional
Right Not to Pay Alimony
The United States Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr' held that Alabama
statutes imposing alimony obligations on husbands but not wives violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In reaching its
decision, the Court subjected the Alabama statutes to a stricter standard of
equal protection analysis than the Court had applied to previously
challenged gender-based classifications that favored women over men.
Furthermore, the Court made it clear that this stricter standard of scrutiny
would have applied whether or not the statutory purpose of the
classification had been affirmatively designed to alleviate the effects of past
discrimination practiced upon women.
The Court in Orr granted standing to a man who did not seek alimony
for himself but instead sought to avoid payment of alimony imposed under
a prior divorce settlement. Therefore, even if the Court held that
Alabama's alimony statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause, it could
not guarantee Mr. Orr relief from his alimony burden. If the Alabama
State Courts responded to a ruling of unconstitutionality by neutrally
extending alimony benefits to men, Mr. Orr would remain obligated to pay
alimony. Only on the unlikely state response of total abolition of alimony
would Mr. Orr escape his burden.
This Comment will examine the Court's opinion in Orr and will
demonstrate that the Court's grant of standing to a party who arguably did
not meet the constitutional requirements of standing followed a recent
liberal trend2 in this area of law. The Court in Orr, however, declined the
opportunity to fashion a rational framework for the law of standing, so
that it remains a highly amorphous area of law. This Comment will also
explain that the Court's decision on the equal protection issue followed
recent precedent3 in the area of reverse racial discrimination and developed
a consistent standard of equal protection analysis applicable to statutes
that discriminate in favor of females as well as statutes that discriminate
against females. Finally, the equal protection decision in Orr will be
criticized for its failure to provide guidelines that a bona fide affirmative
action gender-based statute may follow to pass constitutional muster.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. Facts
On February 26, 1974, a final decree of divorce was entered dissolving
1. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59(1978);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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the marriage of William Orr, the appellant, and Lilliam Orr, the appellee.
Incorporated within this decree was a written stipulation by which Mr. Orr
agreed to pay Mrs. Orr the sum of $1,240 per month for her support and
maintenance On July 28, 1976, alleging that Mr. Orr was $2,848 in
arrears in his alimony payments,6 Mrs. Orr initiated a contempt
proceeding in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama.7 On August 19,
1976, at the hearing on Mrs. Orr's petition, Mr. Orr filed a motion in his
defense alleging that Mrs. Orr's petition was founded on an illegal decree
since it relied upon Alabama alimony statutes8 that were unconstitutional
because they authorized the courts to place an obligation of alimony upon
husbands but not upon wives. 9 The Circuit Court denied Mr. Orr's motion
and awarded Mrs. Orr $5,524, covering back alimony and attorney's fees.10
Mr. Orr appealed the judgment, relying on his federal equal
protection claim." The sole issue taken before the Court of Civil Appeals
of Alabama was whether Alabama's alimony statutes were con-
stitutional. 12 Adopting the rationale of Kahn v. Shevin,"3 the court
sustained the statutes' constitutionality, noting that the disparity in
earning between a lone woman and a lone man that had justified
preferential treatment for widows in Kahn was equally applicable to
divorcees. 14
On May 24, 1977, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Mr. Orr's
petition for a writ of certiorari, but on November 10, 1977, the court
quashed the writ as improvidently granted.1 5 Although the majority filed
no opinion, a concurring opinion by Justice Almon noted that gender-
based laws "designed to foster and preserve the family unit"'6 were
constitutionally permissible. Justice Jones, however, in his dissent, found
the challenged statutes arbitrary and without rational basis.'
7
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear
Mr. Orr's appeal. 8 In a 6-3 decision' 9 it reversed the Alabama Court of
4. 440 U.S. 268, 270 (1979).
5. Orr v. Orr, 351 So.2d 906,906 (Ala.1977) (Torbert, J., dissenting), rev'd, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
6. Id. at 907.
7. 440 U.S. 268, 270 (1979).
8. ALA. CODE §§ 30-2-51, 30-2-52 (1975).
9. 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 351 So. 2d 904, 904 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977),rev'd440
U.S. 268 (1979).
13. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
14. 351 So. 2d 904,905 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977), rev'd,440
U.S. 268 (1979), quoting, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
15. 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
16. Id. (Almon, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 908 (Jones, J., dissenting).
18. 436 U.S. 924 (1978).
19. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented onjurisdictional grounds.
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Civil Appeals. 2 The majority found Mr. Orr to have standing to assert his
equal protection defense 2' and dismissed adequate state grounds
considerations,22 noting that the Alabama Court's had deemed the federal
constitutional issue the "sole issue" before them.23 Addressing the merits of
the case, the Court held the Alabama statutory scheme that permitted
awards of alimony to women but not to men deprived Mr. Orr of the
24constitutionally guaranteed right to equal protection under the laws.
II. STANDING
A. Constitutional Background
Mr. Orr's standing before a federal court to assert his constitutional
defense depended upon whether his challenge to the Alabama statutory
scheme fell within the constitutional and prudential limitations on federal
court jurisdiction.25
The constitutional limitations of the standing doctrine require the
litigant to have made out a case or controversy 26 within the meaning of
article 111.27 The threshhold question in determining the standing aspect of
justiciability is whether the litigant "has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues. 28
In addition to this minimum constitutional requirement, the Supreme
Court has developed prudential rules of self-restraint that have ordinarily
precluded parties from challenging the constitutionality of state or federal
actions by invoking the rights of third persons. 29 The common theme
20. 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979).
21. Id. at 272.
22. The adequate state grounds considered were timeliness in asserting the constitutional claim
and state contract law. Id. at 276-77.
23. 351 So. 2d 904, 905 (1979).
24. 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
25. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1974).
26. In Muscrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-59 (1911), the Court explained:
[B]y the express terms of the Constitution, the exercise of judicial power is limited to "cases"
and "controversies".... [Art. III] does not extend thejudicial power to every violation of
the Constitution which may possibly take place, but to a "case in law or equity" in which a
right under such law is asserted in a court of justice.
"Case or controversy" is not defined by the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has not developed a
mechanical defination with specific terms, but instead has established a number of criteria that must be
met before a case or controversy is present. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (1935).
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
28. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
29. The limitation ofjudicial self-restraint has been riddled with exceptions under the doctrine of
jus tertii-the litigant's claim that a single application of the law injures him and impinges upon the
constitutional rights of third parties. The factors for allowingjus tertii include: (1) the presence of some
substantial relationship between the litigant and the third party; (2) the impossibility of the rightholder
asserting his own constitutional rights; and (3) the need to avoid dilution of the third party's
constitutional rights. Note, Standing To Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 423 (1974).
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underlying both the constitutional and the prudential limitations has been
that a litigant could not attack the constitutionality of a statute unless he
30has shown that he himself has been injured by its operation.
It has been argued that in recent years the constitutional limitations of
standing have been substantially reduced. The Supreme Court "without
recognizing the significance of what it has done . . . transformed the law
of standing from a constitutional to a statutory question."3 The
foundation for this transformation first appeared in Justice Harlan's
dissent in Flast v. Cohen,32 in which he challenged the constitutional
mandate that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. He depicted individual litigants to be acting as "private
attorney's-general ' 33 and would have granted these litigants standing as
representatives of the public interest to contest the constitutionality of
governmental actions. The relief that the courts could afford these litigants
consisted entirely of the vindication of rights held in common by all
citizens.34 Although a majority of the Court has not expressly adopted
Justice Harlan's view, the Court has allowed Congress by statute35 to
confer standing on parties who arguably would not otherwise meet the
article III case or controversy requirement of personal stake in the
outcome. For example, the Clean Air Act 36 provides that "any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against the Administrator
[of the Environmental Protection Agency] where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the Administrator."" The Act's legislative history
disclosed that this provision was drawn to permit plaintiffs to challenge
administrative inaction without having to demonstrate any injury in fact.38
Therefore, arguably the only constitutional requirement of standing that
remains would be the concrete adverseness that enables the litigant to
present the issues of the controversy adequately.
The Court has referred to the law of standing as a "complicated
specialty of federal jurisdiction. 3 9 Recent alterations in the law of
standing, which have not been consistently applied, have added to its
30. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
31. Tushnet, The New Law ofStanding:A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663,665
(1977).
32. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
33. Id. at 119.
34. Id. at 118.
35. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1977), under which United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), was brought. SCRAPis discussed atnote 50 and accompanying
text infra; Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1973), under which Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), was brought. Trafficante is discussed at note 48 and
accompanying text infra.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
37. Id. 1857h-2(a) (2) (1970).
38. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976).
39. United States ex rel Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
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complexity.40 These recent changes, whether they alter the constitutional
or prudential limitations on standing, can best be explained by dividing the
standing requirements they alter into three categories: direct injury,
redressable injury, and injury in fact.
1. Direct Injury Requirement
The basic requirement of direct injury, or causal relationship, was set
forth in the companion cases of Frothingham v. Mellon and
Massachusetts v. Mellon,41 which held that a litigant who had challenged a
governmental action was required to show "that he [had] sustained or
[was] immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he [suffered] in some indefinite way in
common with people generally., 42 Based on this criterion, the Court in
Frothingham held a federal taxpayer to have no standing to challenge a
federal expenditure. Thirty years later in Doremus v. Board of Educa-
tion,43 the Court continued to deny taxpayers' suits under the direct in-
jury requirement as defined in Frothingham. Doremus involved a tax-
payer's challenge of Bible-reading in public schools. The Court found the
taxpayer to lack the requisite special injury necessary to invoke federal
court jurisdiction.
In the late Sixties, the Court embarked on a liberalizing trend of the
direct injury requirement. In Flast v. Cohen44 the Court permitted a
taxpayers' suit that sought to enjoin federal expenditures to finance
instruction in parochial schools. The Court, under a "nexus test,' 45 found a
taxpayer to be a "proper party to allege the unconstitutionality of exercises
of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I. § 8,
of the Constitution. 46
In the years following Flast, the Court granted standing to litigants
alleging an increasingly "attenuated line of causation to the eventual
injury. 47 In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,48 the
Court held that tenants of an apartment complex had standing to
complain that the owner racially discriminated against minorities by
renting in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 .49 The alleged direct
injury in Trafficante embodied the lost social and economic benefits of
40. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22 (1978 Supp.).
41. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
42. Id. at 488.
43. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
44. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
45. The "nexus test" required some logical link between the taxpayer's status as a taxpayer and
his claim of injury. Id. at 102.
46. Id.
47. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
48. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. The Civil Rights Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1973), gave the right to sue to anyperson
who claimed to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.
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living in an integrated community. In 1973, in United States v. SCRAP, 0
the Court ruled environmental groups to have standing to challenge the
Interstate Commerce Commission's failure to suspend a surcharge on
railroad freight rates. A general rate increase would allegedly have caused
increased use of nonrecyclable commodities, thus resulting in the need to
use more natural resources, some of which might be taken from the
environmental groups' Washington area, and resulting also in more refuse
that might be discarded in national parks in the same area.
Although the Court in SCRAP reached a peak in its liberal trend
holding an "identifiable trifle enough for standing,"51 the progression of
this trend had not been consistent. Just a year prior to its decision in
SCRAP, the Court decided Linda R. S. v. Richard D.52 in which the direct
injury requirement was defined by a much stricter standard. In Linda R.
S., the Court found the mother of an illegitimate child to have no standing
to challenge a state penal statute that had been judicially interpreted to
provide prosecution for nonsupport only of parents of legitimate children.
Citing Massachusetts v. Mellon,53 the Court categorized the appellant's
complaint as an abstract injury, insufficient under the standing doctrine
that required "some direct injury as the result of [a statute's] enforce-
ment. 54
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,55 also coun-
ter to the trend set in Trafficante and SCRAP, the Court denied standing
to citizens who sought to enjoin members of Congress from serving in the
Armed Forces Reserve. Federal court jurisdiction required more than the
assertion of a generalized interest under the incompatibility clause of
article I, section six, of the Constitution. 6 In addition, in United States v.
Richardson,57 the Flast decision was strictly limited to taxpayer suits
under article I, section eight of the Constitution. The Court held that a
federal taxpayer did not have standing to challenge that the Central
Intelligence Agency Act, which provided that C.I.A. appropriations and
expenditures not be made public, violated article I, section nine, of the
Constitution, which requires that a regular statement of account of the
receipts and expenditures of all public money be published from time to
time.
Continuing to backslide to rigid enforcement of the causal
relationship requirement, the Court in Warth v. Seldin5" denied standing
to a challenge of exclusionary zoning practices brought by plaintiffs who
50. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
51. Id. at 689, n.14.
52. 410 U.S. 614 (1972).
53. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
54. 410 U.S. 447, 618 (1973).
55. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
56. Id. at 217.
57. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
58. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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represented local taxpayers', building associations' and minority interests.
The Court maintained that the plaintiffs did not meet the minimal article
III requirement that the asserted injury be the consequence of the
defendant's actions. In 1976, the Court reiterated this position in Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.5 9 There the Court held
that indigents, who had been denied hospital services, had no standing to
challenge a Revenue Ruling that granted favorable tax treatment to
hospitals despite their refusal to give full service to indigents.
In the same year in two separate decisions, the Court granted standing
to claimants alleging seemingly no greater causal relationship than the
plaintiffs in either Warth or Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights. On facts
almost identical to those in Warth, the Court, in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corporation,0 granted standing to a housing
association to challenge exclusionary zoning practices. Furthermore, in
1976 the Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth61
found two physicians to have standing to challenge abortion statutes that
required women under eighteen to obtain parental consent and married
women to obtain spousal consent. The causal relationship requirement
was not emphasized in either Arlington Heights or Planned Parenthood.
Moreover, in a more recent case, Duke Power Company v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group,62 language of the opinion limited the causal
relationship requirement to taxpayers' suits. "We . . . cannot accept the
contention that, outside the context of taxpayers' suits, a litigant must
demonstrate anything more than injury in fact and a substantial likelihood
that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury
to satisfy the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III.""6
2. Redressable Injury Requirement
In Warth the Court added a second element to the standing standard.
In addition to the requirement of a direct injury resulting from the
challenged practices, the Court required the claimant to allege "that he
personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. 64
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights further defined the redressable injury
requirement of Warth as a "substantial likelihood that victory in this suit
would result in respondents' receiving the . .. treatment they desire. 65
In subsequent cases the redressable injury requirement did not pose
an impenetrable barrier to standing. If the Court wished to reach the merits
of a case, it encountered little problem in finding a substantial likelihood
59. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
60. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
61. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
62. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
63. Id. at 79.
64. 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
65. 426 U.S. 26, 45-6 (1976).
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that the injury was redressable. The Court in Arlington Heights found at
least a "substantial probability '66 that the claimant there would gain
ultimate redress through the Court's intervention. Similarly, in Duke
Power the Court accepted the district court's finding of a substantial
likelihood that the nuclear power plants in issue would be neither
completed nor operated absent the validity of the challenged Price-
Anderson Act.6 7
Since its decision in Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights the Court has
not relied upon the redressable injury requirement to deny a litigant
standing. Furthermore, in Regents of the"University of California v.
Bakke,68 language in a footnote of Justice Powell's opinion reduced the
"substantial likelihood" requirement to merely any likelihood.69 Justice
Powell observed that
"even if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in
the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he lacked
standing. The constitutional element of standing is plaintiffs demonstration
of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by favorable decision of
his claim.
7
3. Injury in Fact Requirement
The redressable injury requirement fulfilled to a large extent the same
purpose as the direct injury requirement. If the Court's invalidation of the
challenged government action would redress the litigant's injury, a good
likelihood existed that the alleged injury was caused by the challenged
action. Therefore, although the direct injury requirement was strictly
limited to taxpayers' suits by the language of Duke Power, its underlying
function continued to be served by the redressable injury requirement.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have not, however, required strict
enforcement of the redressable injury requirement.71
The problem with both the direct injury requirement and the
redressable injury requirement is that neither has been clearly defined. The
courts have been allowed great leeway in determining how much of a
connection between the alleged injury and challenged action is needed and
how much of a likelihood that the injury be redressable is required. This
has resulted in inconsistent application of the law of standing. One
solution to this problem is to eliminate both of these requirements and to
make injury in fact the only requirement for standing.
Injury in fact as the sole test of standing was first espoused in 1970 by
Justices Brennan and White in Association of Data Processing Service
66. 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1976).
67. 438 U.S. 59, 77 (1978).
68. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
69. Id. at 280-81, n.14.
70. Id. [emphasis added]
71. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
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Organization, Incoiporated v. Camp.72 The majority in Camp presented a
two part test to determine whether standing requirements had been met:
(1) "whether the plaintiff allege[d] to have suffered some injury in fact, 73
and (2) "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant
[was] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 74 In a concurring
opinion, Justices Brennan and White argued that injury in fact should be
the sole test for standing.75 Because of its failure to mention the zone of
interests test, the Court in SCRAP and Trafficante appeared to adopt the
Brennan-White position. This approach was temporarily abandoned,
however, as the Court in Warth and Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
returned to strict application of the direct injury requirement and replaced
the zone of interest test with the redressable injury requirement. In Duke
Power, however, injury in fact replaced the direct injury requirement in
nontaxpayer suits,76 and in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke the
importance of the redressable injury requirement was greatly reduced. 7
Therefore, prior to the Court's decision in Orr v. Orr, injury in fact was the
primary requirement of standing in federal courts.
B. Orr v. Orr
The Court in Orr v. Orr7' addressed the jurisdictional issue whether
Mr. Orr, who did not seek alimony for himself, could attack on equal
protection grounds state statutes79 that awarded alimony to women but
denied alimony to men. The Court did not question whether Mr. Orr had
alleged an injury in fact. The Court did inquire, however, into whether that
injury would be redressed by a favorable holding in federal court.
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, argued that Mr. Orr's alleged injury (the burden of alimony
payments) was neither a result of, nor directly related to, the challenged
statutes. Justice Rehnquist contended that the alimony obligation was not
conferred by statute but instead was fixed by agreement between Mr. Orr
and his ex-wife. Mr. Orr made no claim this agreement would be
unenforceable under state law even if the Alabama alimony statutes were
declared unconstitutional. Justice Rehnquist therefore found Mr. Orr not
to have met" 'the minimum requirement of Art. III: to establish that, in
72. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
73. Id. at 152.
74. Id. at 153. The zone of interest test was largely unadopted in subsequent decisions. See, e.g.,
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22 (1970).
75. 397 U.S. 150, 172, (1970).
76. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
78. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
79. See note 8 supra.
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fact the asserted injury was the consequence of the [unconstitutional
statutes]. . . . , 590 The majority did not address the dissent's argument,
presumably because it espoused a direct injury requirement that Duke
Power had held relevant only to taxpayers' suits.
The majority found Mr. Orr to have standing under primarily an
injury in fact-redressable injury standard. This position, however, was
supported by four alternative bases: (1) Mr. Orr had made a claim for
alimony; (2) Mr. Orr would receive ultimate relief in the event Alabama
would repeal its alimony statutes; (3) Mr. Orr would receive partial relief in
the event Alabama would neutrally extend alimony benefits to husbands;
and (4) Mr. Orr's alimony burden alone conveyed him standing.
1. Mr. Orr's Claim To Alimony
In a footnote," the majority alluded to the possibility that Mr. Or's
circuit court motion challenging the constitutionality of the Alabama
statutes could be construed as a claim for alimony. If the Court accepted
Mr. Orr's motion as a claim for alimony, then it would have satisfied the
redressable injury theory of standing, which requires a substantial
likelihood that the requested relief ultimately redress the alleged harm. If
the statutes were found unconstitutional, there would exist a substantial
likelihood that Alabama would respond by extending benefits to husbands
rather than abolishing alimony altogether. Therefore, because a sex-
neutral alimony statute would provide a husband seeking alimony with
ultimate relief, Mr. Orr would have met the redressable injury requirement
of standing. Justice Rehnquist, however, in dissent, pointed out a serious
flaw in this reasoning.8 2 On the basis of financial need, Mr. Orr was
demonstrably not entitled to alimony even if he had sought it.
The majority further noted that the Alabama appeals court opinion
referred to one of Mr. Orr's arguments as challenging the failure of the
statutes to provide alimony to husbands.83 Although the Court recognized
that Mr. Orr's argument might have been an improper way to assert
standing under state law, it noted that the state court did not challenge Mr.
Orr's standing. Justice Rehnquist argued that this reasoning failed to
acknowledge that a state court's opinion could not convey standing to a
litigant in a federal court.84 At a minimum, federal standing must be ruled
by the case or controversy provision of article III, section two, of the
Constitution.85
2. Ultimate Relief by Repeal of the Statutes
Assuming that Mr. Orr had not made a proper assertion for alimony,
80. 440 U.S. 268, 296 (1979), quoting, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.s. 501, 505 (1975).
81. Id. at 271, n.2.
82. Id. at 294.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 294, n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. Id.
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the majority found the possibility of repeal of the alimony statutes to be a
second route around the standing requirements. Justice Brennan reasoned
that in every equal protection attack on an underinclusive statute, the state
could choose to either extend the benefits to the previously excluded class
or deny the benefits to all classes by repealing the statute. The Court had no
way of knowing in which way the state would respond. Regardless of the
position he took, Mr. Orr's success theoretically could be defeated. If Mr.
Orr asserted a claim to receive alimony, he would be deprived this relief if
Alabama chose to repeal the alimony statutes. If he asserted a right not to
pay alimony, he would be deprived this relief if Alabama chose to extend
alimony benefits to husbands. The Court therefore stated that "unless we
are to hold that underinclusive statutes can never be challenged because
any plaintiffs success can theoretically be thwarted, Mr. Orr must be held
to have standing here.,
86
Justice Brennan supported the preceding conclusion with the Court's
holding in Stanton v. Stanton87 and Craig v. Boren,88 in which the Court
had granted standing to litigants despite its recognition that the state's
response to the finding of unconstitutionality could deny the litigants
ultimate relief. Both Stanton and Craig involved gender-based
classifications that designated the age of majority at eighteen for females
and at twenty-one for males. In Stanton, the plaintiff would have been
awarded ultimate relief if the state chose to raise the age of female majority
to twenty-one for child support purposes. In Craig the plaintiff would have
received her requested relief if Oklahoma chose to lower the age of
majority for males to eighteen. In both Stanton and Craig a substantial
likelihood existed that the state would decide to remedy the invalid statute
in a way that provided ultimate relief to the party successfully asserting the
constitutional challenge.89
In Orr there was no substantial likelihood that Alabama would
choose to repeal its alimony statutes. As Justice Rehnquist observed, "the
possibility that Alabama will turn its back on the thousands of women
currently dependent on alimony checks for their support is, as a practical
matter, non-existent."90 Even if such an impractical course were taken by
Alabama, Mr. Orr had not shown that complete abrogation of the alimony
statutes would provide him relief. His alimony obligation was fixed by an
agreement between him and his ex-wife. He made no claim that this
agreement would be unenforceable under state law in the event of repeal of
the alimony statutes.
86. Id. at 272.
87. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
88. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
89. In Stanton, other Utah Code provisions defined child to be a son or daughter under twenty-
one years of age. 421 U.S. at 12. In Craig the Oklahoma civil and criminal responsibility statutes placed
the age of majority for both sexes at eighteen. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
90. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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Although it did not specifically address the preceding arguments, the
majority stated that Mr. Orr had standing because his "constitutional
attack holds the only promise of escape"9' from his burden. It was clear
that the chances of Mr. Orr's ultimate success failed to reach the
substantial likelihood requirement espoused in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights, because it was doubtful that any likelihood existed that Alabama
would choose to completely abrogate its alimony statutes. Therefore, the
Court took a further liberal step beyond the "any likelihood" require-
ment 92 set forth in Bakke. The majority in Orr reduced the redressable
injury requirement from a likelihood to an "only promise" of escape from
the injury.
3. Partial Relief by Gender-Neutral Alimony
The Court, again by footnote,93 suggested a third basis supporting
their finding of standing. The Court took note of Mr. Orr's argument that
even a gender-neutral statute would have afforded him relief in the form of
lower alimony payments because the current statutes awarded alimony to
wives based not only upon financial need but also upon gender-related
factors. Although the Court found it unnecessary to resolve these
allegations, it nonetheless noted that they "render unassailable 94 Mr.
Orr's standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes.
Under this alternative of standing the Court inferred that although
there must be some chance that the injury be redressable, the ultimate relief
of that injury need not be complete. The chance of any relief-albeit only
partial-would have met the redressable injury requirement.
4. Injury in Fact as the Sole Test of Standing
The final basis of standing did not deal with the probability of Mr.
Orr's ultimate success. It emphasized instead the burden borne by Mr. Orr
that he would not have borne had be been female. The Court found that
this "burden alone is sufficient to establish standing." 95 The Court
reinforced this position with dicta taken from a footnote in Linda R. S. v.
Richard D.,96 in which it maintained that "the parent of a legitimate child
who must by statute on the ground that the parents of an illegitimate child
is not equally burdened." 97 Similarly, the statutes challenged by Mr. Orr
were underinclusive not only because they failed to grant alimony benefits
to financially needy husbands but also because they failed to extend the
burden of alimony to financially secure wives with dependent husbands.
91. Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
92. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
93. 440 U.S. 268, 273-74, n. 3 (1979).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 273.
96. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
97. Id. at 619 n.5.
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The court waived the standing requirement of redressable injury in
Mr. Orr's challenge to the alimony statutes, which were underinclusive in
their burden. 98 To establish standing Mr. Orr needed only to prove that he
suffered an injury-his obligation to pay alimony. Thus, in challenges to
underinclusive statutes, the majority adopted the Brennan-White position
of injury in fact as the sole test of standing.
The Court's reasoning under this fourth and final basis of standing
was understandable. Applying the injury in fact test to determine Mr. Orr
had standing followed a natural progression of the Court's recent liberal
trend in the law of standing. Furthermore, under this test the Court
escaped the problem of speculating how the state courts would respond to
an unconstitutional statute. If injury in fact were the sole test of standing, it
would remove from the federal courts the problem of measuring a litigant's
chances for ultimate relief. Under this test, the only standing issue the court
need address would be whether the litigant had alleged a bona fide injury.
If he had, then the standing requirements have been met.
C. Future Implications of Orr v. Orr
In expressing the opinion of the majority in Orr, Justice Brennan took
a further step toward implementing injury in fact as the sole test of
standing. The requirement that the injury be redressable by the Court
vanished as the Court stated: "The burden alone is sufficient to establish
standing."99 This position was undercut by the tortured reasoning the
Court employed to find that Mr. Orr did indeed allege a redressable injury.
The Court, nevertheless, espoused a more liberal view on standing by
moderating the prior requirement of a likelihood that the injury be
redressable to a more easily met requirement that the Court's intervention
hold the litigants only promise of relief.100 This more liberal approach on
standing may carry an administrative cost of a substantial increase in the
Supreme Court's workload.
In future federal court cases Orr generally should be viewed as a
further step in the liberal trend in the law of standing. If a claimant has
alleged an injury in fact which carries any chance of being redressed by the
court's intervention, the claimant should be granted standing.
Although this "liberal" test of standing can be viewed as progressive,
forcible criticism can be made against any standing test that requires more
than a showing of concrete adverseness.101 The validity of a redressable
injury requirement can be seriously questioned in light of the Court's
decision in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth. °2 In Haworth the
98. 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979).
99. Id.
100. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
101. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663,
665 (1977).
102. 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
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Court upheld the constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act,' °3
finding the article III case or controversy requirement met if the Court
must decide the claims of truly adversary parties in a fully developed
factual setting. The requirement of injury in fact should not be viewed as a
constitutional limitation on standing but as a statutory limitation that rests
on congressional intention to grant standing to those persons best able to
enforce the statute. As Justice Stewart noted in his dissent in Richard-
son ,104 a litigant complaining of a governmental failure to perform a
constitutional duty has alleged an infringement of a private right to benefit
from the performance of that duty.'15 In Orr, Mr. Orr's standing to assert
his equal protection defense is not conferred by article III of the
Constitution but by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Mr. Orr's standing to assert this defense should only be
questioned if he has failed to demonstrate concrete adverseness of his
claim. If the factual setting of Mr. Orr's claim provided adequate
illumination of the operation of the challenged alimony statutes, the Court
thus should proceed to the merits of his claim without further inquiry into
the standing question.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUES
A. Constitutional Background
The Supreme Court traditionally has conducted equal protection
analysis under either the rational basis or the strict scrutiny test. If
challenged governmental action involved neither fundamental civil 10 6 or
constitutional 10 7 rights nor suspect classifications based on race, 
°0
alienage,' °9 or national origin,'° the rational basis test was applied. Under
this test a federal court would not set aside a discriminatory classification if
any state of facts reasonably could be conceived to justify it.''
Furthermore, unless the classification was patently arbitrary, the Court
would "[presume the legislatures] to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that in practice, their laws result in some
inequality."" 2 When fundamental rights or suspect classifications were
involved, however, the Court conducted its equal protection analysis by
strict scrutiny. Under this level of analysis, the Court required the
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 (1970).
104. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
105. 418 U.S. 166, 203 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to marry constitutes as basic civil
right).
107. See, e.g., Shaprio v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (constitutional right to travel
interstate).
108. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
109. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
110. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
111. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
112. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
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government to demonstrate that the challenged action or legislation served
overriding or compelling interests that could not be as well served by either
a more carefully tailored classification or less drastic means.113 Under the
strict scrutiny test, the Court employs a virtually irrebuttable presumption
against the validity of the challenged action or legislation.
114
During the past decade the Court developed an intermediate test to be
applied in challenges of gender-based classifications. The Court first
expressed this test in 1971 in Reed v. Reed.15 In Reed, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, held unconstitutional an Idaho
statute that granted a mandatory preference to males when competing
applications for letters of probate administration had been filed by male
and female family members. 16 Although the Court found the challenged
statute's objective of reducing the workload on probate courts "not
without some legitimacy,"'1 17 it found the manner in which that objective
was advanced inconsistent with the command of the equal protection
clause that "a classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.' ,118
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,1 9 Justice Brennan,
writing for a plurality, went beyond the Court's position in Reedto find sex
an inherently suspect classification. Based on this finding, the plurality
applied "close judicial scrutiny' 120 to a federal statute that, under the guise
of administrative convenience, required female Air Force officers, but not
male officers, to prove that their spouses were in fact dependent on them
for support before increased medical benefits would be made available to
them. 121 The Court found the legislation to be premised on the outdated
and unsupported presumption of a wife's dependency for support on her
husband.122 The Court therefore found the legislative objective of
administrative convenience to fall below the mandate of the equal
protection clause. Justice Brennan, however, distinguished this type of
legislation from benign gender-based legislation designed to rectify the
effects of past discrimination against women. This desired result was
achieved because instead of discrimination against women, the legislation
gave preferred treatment to women over similarly situated men. 23 The
113. 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
114. 91 HARV. L. REv. 188 (1977).
115. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
116. Id. at 72.
117. Id. at 76.
118. Id., quoting, Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
119. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
120. Id. at 682.
121. Id. at 678.
122. Id. at 681.
123. Id. at 689, n.22.
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Court in Frontiero thus left open the question of the constitutionality of
gender-based classifications designed to favor women.
The following year this issue was encountered in Kahn v. Shevin .'
2 4
Mr. Kahn, a widower, challenged an 1885 Florida statute that provided a
$500 real property tax exemption to widows but not widowers. Expressing
the views of the majority, Justice Douglas retreated from his position in
Frontiero that sex was a suspect classification; accordingly, strict scrutiny
of the Florida statute was not required. The Court held this statute
constitutional as "a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
which the loss imposes a disporportionately heavy burden."'1
25
The constitutionality of benign sex discrimination was again
addressed the following year in Schlesinger v. Ballard.2 6 A male naval
officer challenged a statutory discharge provision that allowed female
naval officers a longer term of service without promotion before discharge
became mandatory. The provision presumably was designed to correct for
the more limited promotion opportunities of women. 12 Characterizing the
provision as being remedial in nature and upholding its constitutionality,
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, distinguished the statute from the
classifications in Reed and Frontiero, which presumably were based upon
"overbroad generalizations ' 121 concerning sex roles and to be supported
solely by administrative convenience. 129 The Ballard Court premised its
holding upon the "complete rationality" of the naval provision, thus
suggesting application of the rational basis test to remedial gender-based
classifications.130 Continuing to urge suspect classification status for
gender-based classifications, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall, dissented from the holding. Justice Brennan further found
no legislative history to support the remedial purpose upon which the
majority opinion relied and therefore found the majority's willingness to
"conjure up"'31 legislative purposes to be a retreat from the Court's recent
analysis into the objectives underlying challenged classifications. 32
The holdings in Kahn and Ballard were viewed by some commen-
tators as offering women "the best of all worlds-a Supreme Court ready
to strike down classifications that discriminate against females, yet vigilant
to preserve laws that favor them."'33 Several state and lower federal courts
124. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
125. Id. at 355.
126. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
127. Id. at 508.
128. Id. at 507.
129. Id. at 510.
130. Id. at 509.
131. Id. at 511
132. Id. at 520-21.
133. Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CoNN. L. REv.
813. 818 (1978).
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viewed Kahn and another sex discrimination case, Geduldig v. Aiello, 13 4 as
a return of substantial deference to state social and economic legislation.
135
Later in the same term in which Ballard was decided, the Supreme
Court decided Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.13 1 Justice Brennan, in a
unanimous opinion, applied the rationale of the Ballard dissent-close
scrutiny of legislative purpose-to a Social Security Act provision that
granted widows, but not widowers, survivor's benefits based upon
earnings of the deceased spouse. The Court conducted a detailed analysis
of section 402(g) of the Social Security Act and found that, in its
enactment, Congress had not been concerned with compensating women
for past discrimination in employment opportunities. The Court found
instead that Congress was concerned with the principle that children of
covered employees were entitled to the personal attention of the surviving
parent if that parent chose not to work. 137 That the government's choice of
women and not men for that purpose evidenced that the legislation was
based on the sexually stereotypic presumption that widows as a group
would choose to forego work to care for children while widowers would
not. 38 Moreover, the Court found the challenged provision actually
penalized female wage earners by providing them less protection for their
families than male wage earners.139 Given the paternalistic purpose and
actual adverse effect on female wage earners, the Court therefore declared
the gender-based distinction unconstitutional.1
40
Because the Court in Wiesenfeld found the provision to discriminate
against women rather than to favor women, a majority of the Court had
yet to declare sex a suspect classification and therefore to apply "close
scrutiny of legislative purpose' 141 to a bona fide benign gender-based
classification.
In 1976 the Court in Craig v. Boren142 invalidated the benign gender-
based classification of an Oklahoma statute that linked sex to alcohol
related accidents to forbid the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the
age of twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen. 143 Because the
Court continued to withhold suspect status from gender-based
134. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
135. See, e.g., Kohrv. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299 (1974), vacatedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 422
U.S. 1050 (1975) (Social Security benefit calculation formula favoring females through use of three
fewer elapsed years held to violate no constitutional principle); Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206
S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) (Georgia alimony statute providing support only
for wives held not to violate either state or federal constitutions).
136. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
137. Id. at 648.
138. Id. at 651-52.
139. Id. at 645.
140. Id. at 653.
141. 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1973).
142. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
143. Id. at 191-92.
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classifications, the strict scrutiny test was not applied. Rather, the Court
articulated a refined equal protection test for gender-based classifications
based upon the standards set forth in prior gender discrimination cases:
"[C]lassiciation by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 144
Although the majority recognized traffic safety as an important
governmental objective, it found that the statistical relationship between
gender and traffic safety in relation to beer consumption far too attenuated
to satisfy the requirement that the distinction be substantially related to
achievement of that statutory objective. 145
The following year the Court applied the Craig "means-end" test to a
Social Security Act provision 46 challenged in Califano v. Goldfarb.147 The
Court found unconstitutional a provision that provided survivor's benefits
to any widow, but allowed similar benefits only to those widowers who
could prove that their deceased wife had actually been providing at least
one-half of their support.1 48 As in Wiesenfeld, the Court not only found no
legislative history of remedial purpose but also found that the gender-
based classification actually deprived female wage earners of protection
for their families, which protection similarly situated men received as a
result of their employment.
149
Less than a month after Goldfarb was decided, the Court heard
Califano v. Webster.i50 This was the first Supreme Court case since Ballard
to involve a gender-based classification that favored women without also
penalizing them in the form of reduced benefits to their families. It was also
the first benign gender-based discrimination case to follow Wiesenfeld,
which relied on close scrutiny of legislative purpose, and Craig, which
developed the means-end test.
In Webster a male challenged a Social Security benefit computation
formula 5' that entitled women to use three fewer elapsed years than men
and therefore entitled women to receive higher payments than men with
the same past earnings. The Court upheld the Social Security Act
provision under a Kahn-Ballard rationale-it compensated women for
disabilities resulting from a history of past discrimination against women.
Furthermore, unlike Goldfarb, in Webster the Court found clear
legislative history of a direct remedial purpose-reduction of the disparity
144. Id. at 197.
145. Id. at 201-02.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1), (f) (1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
147. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
148. Id. at 216-17.
149. Id. at 206-07.
150. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
151. Section 215 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §414(1970) (amended 1972).This was the
same code section that was challenged in Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299 (1974), vacatedfor
lack of jurisdiction, 422 U.S. 1050 (1975).
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in economic condition between men and women caused by a long history
of discrimination against women.
152
The Court in Webster appeared to leave open the door to gender-
based classifications adopted by the legislature to compensate women for
the effects of past discrimination. The Court's continued reception to
remedial gender-based statutes, however, must be considered further in
light of its decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.'53
In Bakke a white male challenged a state medical school's special
minorities admissions program. 154 A divided Court struck down, five to
four, the admissions program, which set aside a specific number of places
for minorities, but upheld, five to four, properly devised affirmative action155
programs. In Bakke only five members of the Court reached the equal
protection issue. Four justices found the admissions program's quota
system defective on statutory grounds.1 56 Only Justice Powell, applying
the strict standard of scrutiny, found the quota violative of equal
protection. 157 Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, applying
only an intermediate level of scrutiny, would have upheld the admissions
program. Justice Brennan suggested that affirmative action programs that
meet four criteria should be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny. Those
criteria are: (1) that no fundamental right be involved; (2) that the class
disadvantaged by the program not have the traditional indices of
suspectness; (3) that the classification be relevant to the goal sought; and
(4) that the classification neither be based on a presumption of inferiority
of the favored class nor stigmatize or stereotype that class.
158
In his prevailing opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell clearly distinguish-
ed sex from race and therefore found only the latter a suspect
classification. 59 Justice Brennan, however, in his opinion, compared race
to gender:
First race, like "gender-based classifications too often [has] been inexcusably
utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments of
society." Kahn v. Shevin (dissenting opinion) . . . While a carefully tailored
statute designed to remedy past discrimination could avoid these vices, see
Califano v. Webster; . . . we nonetheless have recognized that the line
between honest and thoughtful appraisal of the effects of past discrimination
and paternalistic stereotyping is not so clear and that a statute based upon the
latter is patently capable of stigmatizing all women with a badge of
inferiority. 1
60
152. 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977).
153. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
154. Id. at 269-70.
155. Id. at 361-62.
156. Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found
the admissions program to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-
4 (1976).
157. 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
158. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 16 (Supp. 1979).
159. 438 U.S. 265, 302-03 (1978).
160. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Thus, prior to Orr v. Orr,16 1 the stage was set for requiring a remedial
gender-based classification to meet the four preliminary criteria of prop-
erly devised affirmative action programs or be subject to strict scrutiny.
B. Orr v. Orr
The Court in Orr v. Orr 62 held that an Alabama statutory scheme
which allowed women but not men to recover alimony from ex-spouses
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court's
decision, although justified on the facts in Orr, left uncertain the
constitutionality of future bona fide affirmative action statutes based on
gender.
The relevant gender-based statutes in Orr were first enacted in 1852
and undoubtedly founded upon paternalistic "old notions" about women
and women's place in society. The Court could have summarily defeated
the challenged classification under the means-end test formulated in Craig.
The Court, however, chose to formulate a stricter equal protection test to
be used on gender-based classifications. The Court made this stricter test
applicable not only to classifications with paternalistic purposes as in Orr
but also to gender-based classifications with compensatory and amelio-
rative purposes. Thus, the Court in Orr violated one of its primary rules
of self-governance, which provides that: "The Court will not 'formulate
a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is to be applied.' ,,163
In the majority opinion Justice Brennan initially set out the means-
end test of equal protection scrutiny as formulated in Craig." 'To with-
stand scrutiny' under the equal protection clause, 'classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.' ,1 64 Given their paternalis-
tic purpose, the Alabama alimony statutes did not meet their standard.
Even prior to formulating the means-end test in Craig, the Court had held
in Wiesenfeld that the "mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose
[was] not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."1 65 Furthermore, in
Wiesenfeld the Court found that a statute based upon the generally
accepted presumption that a man is responsible for the support of his wife
and children would not suffice to justify a gender-based classification. 166
Nonetheless, the Court went beyond the standards articulated in Craig and
Wiesenfeld to require a state, in addition to satisfying the means-end test,
161. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
162. Id.
163. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,347 (1936), quoting, LiverpoolN.Y. &
P.S.S. C. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
164. 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
165. 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
166. Id. at 652-53.
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to prove that the compensatory or ameliorative purpose could not be as
well served as by a gender-neutral classification that would avoid the risks
of reinforcing stereotypes. 1
67
Although the majority subjected both compensatory and
ameliorative gender-based distinctions to the stricter standard of scrutiny,
it recognized a difference between these two types of remedial legislative
purposes. Compensatory actions could be defined as efforts seeking to
rectify present effects of a history of past discrimination. The purpose of
the challenged property tax exemption in Kahn could be viewed as
compensatory. Ameliorative actions could be defined as efforts seeking to
remove the underlying causes of the discrimination. The purpose of the
admissions program challenged in Bakke could be seen as ameliorative as
well as compensatory.
168
The challenged statutes in Orr, however, were neither compensatory
nor ameliorative. The Alabama statutes were the amended versions of
alimony statutes first enacted in 1852.169 Although these statutes were not
accompanied by legislative history, it would be difficult to assume that
they were enacted sixteen years prior to the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment with either a compensatory or ameliorative purpose as their
basis. Furthermore, the Alabama Supreme Court explained that these
statutes were grounded on the common law obligation of a husband to
support his wife and prevent her from becoming a ward of the state.170 Past
precedent clearly had held unconstitutional government objectives that
were based on similar old notions that trapped men and women in
stereotyped roles. 171 Without an important governmental objective as their
basis, the Alabama statutes therefore could have been found un-
constitutional as not meeting the first requirement of the means-end test.
The majority, however, did not limit the opinion to invalidating
reverse gender-based classifications justified by paternalistic purposes.
The Court expanded the opinion to invalidate reverse gender-based
classifications supported by remedial or administrative convenience
purposes. The Court achieved this result by assuming important state
objectives. Alabama could have had an interest in financially assisting
needy spouses with sex functioning as an indicator of need. Alabama could
have also had an interest in compensating women for past discrimination
in the institution of marriage. The Court, however, summarily rejected
both of these purposes as invalid. 172 It found that neither constitutionally
supported the sex-based distinction because both could be as well satisfied
167. 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979).
168. See 89 HARV. L. Rav. 47, 102 (1975).
169. ALA. CODE §§ 1971, 1972, 1973 (1975).
170. Davis v. Davis, 279 Ala. 643,644, 189 So. 2d 158, 160 (1960); Sims v. Sims, 253 Ala. 307,
311, 45 So. 2d 25, 29 (1950).
171. See, e.g., Wiesenfeld discussion at notes 165-66 and accompanying text supra.
172. 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979).
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by a gender-neutral statute. Furthermore, the majority added that "even
statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects
of past discrimination must be carefully tailored. 173
Rather than simply stating that administrative convenience did not
constitute an important governmental objective under the means-end test,
the Court found that no administrative convenience was achieved by the
alimony statutes. It assumed little if any additional costs would burden the
state if gender-neutral statutes were enacted. Although one must seriously
question the validity of this assumption, it is more questionable why the
assumption was even made. By this reasoning, the Court pressumably
would be amenable to a gender-based distinction that was supported by a
substantial administrative convenience purpose. Although Reed ap-
parently precludes upholding as constitutional a gender-based statute
justified solely by administrative efficiency, Geduldig could be interpreted
as modifying Reed when administrative considerations were found to be
overly burdensome. Orr suggests an extension of the holding in Geduldig
and a further erosion of Reed. In Orr, the Court therefore does not reject
administrative convenience as an important governmental objective; it
only rejects unjustified and insubstantial administrative convenience as an
important objective.
The majority also found gender-based classifications unconstitu-
tional if their compensatory or ameliorative purpose was as well served by
a gender-neutral classification. This conclusion is puzzling. If an alimony
statute was enacted to reduce the economic disparity between men and
women, which disparity was caused by a long history of discrimination
against women in the institution of marriage, how could that purpose be
achieved by providing alimony to husbands as well? Divorced husbands
have not been alleged to be a class working under an economic burden
caused by a history of discrimination against men in marriage.
In any event there was nothing in Orr to support the existence of either
a compensatory or an ameliorative purpose. Justice Brennan appeared to
use Orr as a vehicle to implicitly elevate gender to suspect status and then
to require that an "arguably" affirmative action statute based upon gender
be required to satisfy the third (that the classification be relevant to the
goal) and fourth (that the classification not stigmatize or stereotype the
favored class) criteria 174 of a properly designed racial affirmative action
program. The majority added these criteria of Bakke to the Craig means-
end test to fashion a stricter standard of equal protection scrutiny for
gender-based classifications. To bejustified under this standard of scrutiny
the gender-based distinction must first meet the Craig means-end test,
which requires the classification to be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of an important governmental objective. Additionally, the purpose
173. Id. at 281.
174. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
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of the gender-preferential legislation must not be as well served by a
gender-neutral statute. Finally, the challenged statute must be carefully
tailored to avoid the stigma of sexual stereotypes.
Courts may encounter substantial difficulties in applying this stand-
ard to bona fide compensatory and ameliorative gender-based statutes.
The only reason the Alabama legislative purpose in Orr was as well served
by a gender-neutral statute was because the statutes did not involve a
compensatory or ameliorative purpose. Compensatory and ameliorative
purposes can not by definition be satisfied by gender-neutral classifica-
tions.
The Court may not have intended that truly compensatory and
ameliorative legislation be subjected to gender-neutral statute compari-
son. It may only have been reiterating its language in Wiesenfeld that noted
the mere recitation of a benign compensatory purpose would not be an
automatic shield against inquiry into the actual statutory purpose. There-
fore, under gender-neutral comparison, perhaps only those statutes that
lack a truly compensatory or ameliorative purpose will be found unjusti-
fied.
Unfortunately, because the statutory purpose in Orr could be as well
satisfied by a gender-neutral statute, the Court provided no guidelines on
how a gender-based classification might meet its final requirement of being
carefully tailored to avoid sexual stigma and stereotyping. If by "carefully
tailored" the Court meant that compensatory and ameliorative statutes
could not be drawn to assist women as a group in overcoming the burden
of generalized discrimination, the Court's decision in Orr does not en-
danger bona fide remedial programs for women and probably advances
the cause for equality between the sexes.
By requiring gender-preferential statutes to define precisely the class
to be benefitted, the Court would eliminate overinclusive statutes that
carry unnecessary costs of additional stigma. The problem of overinclu-
siveness was present in Kahn. There a gender-based classification allowed
all women, regardless of their individual economic circumstances, to
benefit by a property tax exemption granted because women in general
had been subjected to economic discrimination. Statutes like that in Kahn
single out women as a special class incapable of adequately providing for
themselves and therefore in need of a protector, be it a husband, father, or
government. Thus, these statutes serve to reinforce the sexual stereotypes
that true ameliorative statutes seek to eradicate.
If by "carefully tailored" the Court meant that compensatory and
ameliorative gender-based legislation could not carry some risks or sexual
stereotypes, the Court's decision in Orr casts serious doubt on the future of
those statutes designed to rectify the effects and remove the underlying
causes of discrimination against women. Regardless of how precisely these
statutes were drawn, they would be likely to carry some risk of stigma of
sexual stereotypes. This additional "statutory" stigma would in most cases
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be minimal in comparison with the underlying historical stigma the sta-
tutes were designed to remedy. Therefore, some additional stigma should
be tolerated as a present cost of the ultimate elimination of the historical
source of the discrimination. Unfortunately, the Court's opinion in Orr did
not provide legislators with an indication of how much, if any, additional
stigma would be constitutionally permissible.
C. Future Implications of Orr v. Orr
Orr v. Orr175 was the first major benign gender-based discrimination
case to be heard after the Court's decisions in Webster and Bakke. Adopt-
ing the rationale of the Brennan group in Bakke, the Court developed a
stricter standard of equal protection analysis to be applied in challenges of
benign gender-based classifications. Arguably, if a benign gender-based
classification met the Bakke criteria of a properly designed affirmative
action program, the intermediate level of scrutiny, as was applied by the
Brennan group in Bakke, would also apply to a carefully tailored and truly
ameliorative gender-based classification.
Under this equal protection standard, the continued vitality of Kahn
v. Shevin 176 must be seriously questioned. In Kahn, Florida legislation
provided widows but not widowers with an automatic $500 property tax
exemption. The Court assumed the financial difficulties facing a lone
woman exceeded those facing a man, and, therefore, allowed the gender-
preferential statute to stand. This type of generally drawn, compensatory
statute carries costs of sexual stigma that the Orr decision prohibited.
Furthermore, under the facts in Kahn, a gender-neutral statute that
required proof of financial need would better serve the governmental
purpose of alleviating the economic difficulties of citizens who had lost
their marital partners.
The majority, however, did not expressly overrule the decision in
Kahn. Justice Blackmun concurred with the majority in Orr on the as-
sumption that it "in no way cuts back on the Court's decision in Kahn.'
Notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's opinion, Kahn must at a minimum
be viewed as limited by Orr. Outside areas of law, such as tax, in which the
states historically have been granted substantial deference, Kahn presuma-
bly can no longer be relied on as supporting the constitutionality of
generalized gender-preferential treatment.
By implementing a stricter standard of judicial scrutiny in gender-
based classification challenges, for all but the carefully tailored and truly
ameliorative statutes, the Court in Orr progressed toward insuring against
all governmentally fostered discrimination unsupported by a compelling
governmental need. This progression was set back, however, less than two
175. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
176. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
177. 440 U.S. 268, 284 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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months after Orr was decided. On April 24, 1979, the Supreme Court
heard two equal protection cases-Parham v. Hughes178 and Caban v.
Mohammed.179 Both cases involved gender-based classifications that de-
nied unmarried fathers rights that were granted unmarried mothers.
Neither involved a compensatory or an ameliorative statute. The statutes
in both cases were based on archaic generalizations about maternal and
paternal family roles. In Parham the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute and permitted Georgia to deny an unmarried father, but not an
unmarried mother, the right to sue under a wrongful death statute. In
Caban the Court held a New York statute violative of the equal protection
clause by denying an unmarried father, but not an unmarried mother, the
right to object to adoption of his illegitimate child. In Parham, Justice
Stewart, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and by Chief Justice
Burger, distinguished prior precedent, including Orr, by reasoning that
mothers and fathers of illegitimate children were not similarly situated.
Justice Powell concurred in the plurality opinion only because the Georgia
statute allowed an unmarried father to remove the statutory disability by
choosing to legitimize the child. In Caban, New York provided no oppor-
tunity for the unmarried father to remove his disability. Justice Powell
joined those dissenting in Parham-Justices White, Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun-to invalidate the New York gender-based adoption classi-
fication.
The existence of the opportunity to elect to remove a sex-based
disability does not justify an otherwise unjustifiable discriminatory, sex-
based disability. As the dissent in Parham noted: "The plurality not only
fails to examine whether requiring resort by fathers to the legitimization
procedure bears more than a rational relationship to any state interest, but
also fails even to address the constitutionality of the sex discrimination in
allowing fathers but not mothers to legitimate their children."18
The apparent inconsistency between the Parham opinion and the
Caban opinion and between the Parham opinion and the Orr opinion can
be explained by more than the rationale that Parham involved classes of
men and women who were not similarly situated. The Parham case was
probably decided more on policy grounds. Parham involved the denial of
an unwed father's claim for damages under a wrongful death act. There-
fore, Parham can be seen as a refusal to extend the liability of a tortfeasor
rather than a denial of parental rights to the father of an illegitimate child.
Lower courts should limit the decision in Parham to its facts. The
decision in Orr, however, should, to preserve consistency, be given the
broad reading that its language suggests. All gender-based classifications
that are not carefully tailored to avoid the stigma of sexual stereotypes or
178. 441 U.S.347 (1979).
179. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
180. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 361-62 n.2 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
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that are supported by purposes that can be as well served by gender-neutral
classifications will be subjected to the strictest level of equal protection
scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Orr v. Orr continued a liberal trend in the law
of standing. An injury in fact has arguably become the primary require-
ment of standing. The requirement of a redressable injury may be satisfied
even in the absence of a likelihood that the courts intervention will provide
the claimant ultimate relief. If the claimant has alleged a bona fide injury of
which the courts intervention offers some promise of relief, the decision in
Orr will support granting the claimant federal standing. Unfortunately
some of the language of Orr also supports the stricter rules of standing,
which require a substantial likelihood for ultimate relief before federal
court intervention may be gained.
Thus, in Orr the Court has declined the opportunity to precisely limit
and define the rules of standing. The standing language in Orr will con-
tinue to permit a federal court to grant standing when it desires to sustain a
claim on the merits and to deny standing when the substantive claim would
be defeated.
In the area of equal protection, the majority in Orr followed the
rationale of Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke, implicitly elevating
gender to suspect classification status and subjecting all but the carefully
tailored and truly ameliorative gender-based classifications to strict judi-
cial scrutiny. Orr arguably would not foreclose the use of the intermediate
level of scrutiny in the equal protection analysis of a gender-based classifi-
cation that was both carefully tailored and necessary to achieve its goals.
Because the facts in Orr did not involve this type of classification, the
constitutionality of future bona fide affirmative action programs and
statutes in the area of gender remains uncertain.
Diane M. Signoracci
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